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Abstract
Rumor detection in recent years has emerged as an
important research topic, as fake news on social media
now has more significant impacts on people’s lives,
especially during complex and controversial events.
Most existing rumor detection techniques, however,
only provide shallow analyses of users who propagate
rumors. In this paper, we propose a probabilistic model
that describes user maliciousness with a two-sided
perception of rumors and true stories. We model
not only the behavior of retweeting rumors, but also
the intention. We propose learning algorithms for
discovering latent attributes and detecting rumors based
on such attributes, supposedly more effectively when the
stories involve retweets with mixed intentions. Using
real-world rumor datasets, we show that our approach
can outperform existing methods in detecting rumors,
especially for more confusing stories. We also show
that our approach can capture malicious users more
effectively.
1. Introduction
Social media such as Twitter and Weibo have
increasingly become important platforms for getting
information and exchanging ideas. Statistics show
that Twitter has more than 68 million monthly active
users in U.S, while 36 percent of Americans aged 18
to 29 years old use Twitter 1. These include some
very influential users who are opinion leaders and have
millions of followers [1]. During controversial events
such as presidential elections, social media platforms are
treated as arenas for sharing sentiments and exchanging
attacks [2]. Messages propagate on some social media
platforms such as Twitter and Weibo through an activity
called retweeting, with which a user can effortlessly
repeat a message for all their followers to see. Through
retweeting, messages on social media have the potential
1https://www.omnicoreagency.com/twitter-statistics/
to reach hundreds or thousands of people in a short
frame of time [3]. What is more, discussions on social
media have been shown to have significant impact on the
real world. It has been shown that election results are
highly correlated with and can be predicted from social
media discussions [4].
Given this situation, we can say that information
circulating on social media can have significant impacts
on people’s lives. And harmful information such as
fake news can also have a strong consequence, such
as causing public fear during crises [5]. Thus in
recent years, a large number of researches have been
done on social media rumors, including tracking rumor
propagation over time, user roles, and signals for
automatic rumor detection [6, 7, 8, 5]. In some works,
a rumor is defined as a story whose veracity is not
determined [8, 9]. In other works, a rumor is simply
a fake news or misinformation [6, 7]. In this work, we
follow the latter approach, and consider a story either as
a fake story, called a rumor, or a true story.
Different from a number of works that deal with
perceptual credibility [10, 11], in this work we deal
with story veracity, i.e., whether the story contained in
a message is true or false as verified in the real world.
As a unique characteristic, our work is centered on two
rumor-related latent attributes of users who involve in
the message propagation, namely, malicious sensitivity
and malicious perplexity. Malicious sensitivity indicates
how likely a user would retweet rumor, knowing that it is
a rumor, and malicious perplexity indicates how likely a
user would retweet a true story, mistaking it for a rumor.
Such attributes can be used in turn to detect rumors.
Our rumor detection method is based on the users who
retweeted the story, without examining its content. This
gives us more flexibility on the type of stories that
can be handled. For example, picture messages and
non-English messages, which many existing approaches
based on text and linguistic features cannot handle [12,
13], can be handled by our approach. We purposefully
leave out the content of the story in order to focus on
the user and the propagation. However, story contents
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can be added in further implementations to improve
detection accuracy.
The goal of our approach is to discover these latent
user attributes as well as to detect story veracity using
such attributes. To the best of our knowledge, our
work is the first study of learning user maliciousness
and story veracity labels in the same framework. We
expect our work to have critical practical implications.
We have seen nowadays an increasing number of rumors
that are circulating on social media, and it has become
desirable to not only detect rumors at an early stage, but
also impose restriction and even punish malicious users.
The findings of our work can be applied to make such
decisions more effective. Furthermore, we consider that
our approach has a generality that can be applied to
other social media analyses where the label of a post is
dependent on the type of retweeting users. One example
can be detecting posts that have healing effects and users
who suffer depression.
To be presented in detail in Section 5, our approach
is built on a latent variable that indicates user intention.
The intuition is that not all users who retweet a rumor
have the malicious intention of spreading a harmful
rumor. Sometimes a rumor may appear harmless and
cannot be understood easily, and normal users may
mistakenly spread them. With our approach, we can
distinguish between malicious users and normal users
even though they both retweeted rumors (or true stories).
This distinction is particularly useful when the stories
appear to be misleading and are difficult to judge.
To summarize, our main contributions with this work
include:
• We model user intention and story veracity in a
same framework. This approach allows us to detect
malicious users and predict rumor more accurately,
particularly for stories whose veracity is difficult to
judge. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work that models user intention, user maliciousness
and story veracity in the same framework.
• We develop algorithms to learn the user
maliciousness and story veracity. More specifically,
we design a Gibbs sampling algorithm for learning
user attributes from labeled stories, and an
Expectation Maximization algorithm for learning
the veracity of unlabeled stories.
• We test our approach on real-world rumor datasets,
comparing it with a number of baseline approaches.
The evaluation results are consistent with our initial
intuition, that our approach is more powerful for
rumors that are confusing and difficult to judge.
But it shows weakness for rumors that are easy to
recognize.
2. Related Work
Our work follows two recent research trends
regarding social media, namely, rumor detection and
user attribute discovery. We first introduce the related
literature about rumor detection. Castillo et al.
investigated the topic of information credibility on
Twitter, and proposed a prediction model based on a
list of features [14]. They separated tweets into news
and chats, and studied the credibility of news tweets.
News credibility was automatically determined using
supervised machine learning models such as SVM and
decision trees, built upon message-based, user-based,
topic-based, and propagation-based features. While the
focus of this work was the perception of credibility,
instead of the actual veracity of messages, it has set the
standard for a line of researches, and its methodology
has been repeatedly used in later works regarding
message veracity on social media. For example,
Kwon et al. investigated rumor detection on social
media using a similar method [12]. Based on a
dataset labeled as rumor and non-rumor, they tested
the features proposed by Castillo et al. as well as
three categories of new features, temporal, structural,
and linguistic, together with machine learning models
such as SVM and random forest. In a later work
they also investigated feature stability over time with
regard to rumor detection [15]. Yang et al. studied
story veracity on a Chinese microblog platform, Sina
Weibo, with new features including client-based and
location-based features [9]. Comparing to Castillo
features, their approach gained a substantial accuracy
increase. Liu et al. extended this work by a new set
of features called verification features, which included
source credibility, source identification, source diversity,
source and witness location, event propagation, and
belief identification [13]. Zhang et al. investigated
story veracity classification within the health domain,
and reported correlation of features such as mention
of numbers, the source of the rumor, and hyperlinks,
with story veracity [16]. Ma et al. investigated rumor
detection based on time series constructed from existing
features, and showed improved accuracy [17]. As we
can see, most of existing works used a similar method
of constructing features and applying them on common
machine learning models such as SVM and random
forest. However, they did not provide insights of
particular features, especially user-related attributes. We
argue that our work that specifically models latent user
attributes into the framework provides more interesting
insights and may lead to better prediction accuracy.
We next introduce related literature regarding user
profiling on Twitter. There is a number of works
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that use supervised learning for discovering latent user
attributes [18, 19, 20]. Typically, in these works, there
is a training dataset labeled based on the attributes to
be learned, such as age, regional origin, and political
orientation. However, our work follows more closely the
probabilistic approach for learning latent user attributes.
For example, Barbera used a latent variable to represent
users’ political ideal point and proposed to learn the
latent variable in a framework that considers follower
and following connections [21]. Han and Tang proposed
a variable indicating roles of a user in a community and
learned the variable jointly with data and some other
parameters [22]. The learning method was based on
Gibbs sampling and EM, similar to our work. However,
their work cannot be used to address the problem of
discovering user intentions in message propagation.
Although outside social media study, a work by Zhao
et al. proposed an idea of two-sided perception of
truth similar to our work [23]. Their framework was
based on websites that show conflicting data to the same
subject, which is common, for example, in movie review
websites. They considered that the website credibilities
for true positive and true negative were independent,
and were treated separately in their learning framework.
We cannot apply their work in our scenario, however,
because the framework was not modeled after multiple
users propagating the same story. Our model of
two-sided perception of rumors, learned in retweeting
data, is unique, based on our literature review.
3. Framework Overview and User Type
Mapping
Our probabilistic model for malicious user and
rumor detection is placed in a framework that detects
rumors. This framework takes Twitter postings and
clusters them into stories, each consists of a number
of retweets. Some stories are manually assigned labels
of either rumor or true story. The output of the
framework is a set of prediction for unlabeled stories.
The overview of the framework is shown in Figure 1.
The core technique of learning user maliciousness and
story veracity will be presented in the next section. In
this section, we will briefly introduce the pre-processing
step of user type mapping.
On Twitter, many users do not tweet often [1]. When
we examine retweeting behavior, we find a user sparsity
problem that many users only retweeted once in the
dataset. It is very difficult to learn story veracity based
on retweeting users who appear only once, and our
solution is to generalize users into a discrete number
of user types. Consequently, the model learns the story
veracity not based on users, but on user types, which
Story Data Training Data
User Type 
Mapping
Testing Data
Malicious 
Sensitivity, 
Malicious 
Perplexity
Prediction
Twitter 
Data
Story 
Clustering 
and Labels
Figure 1. Rumor detection framework overview
carry more information.
Here we follow an unsupervised approach based on
user attributes and clustering. We follow an existing
work and extract six rumor-related attributes from user
data [24]. These include presence of extreme keywords
in the profile, following count, tweeting frequency,
percentage of tweets containing topic-related keywords,
percentage of tweets containing pictures, and percentage
of tweets containing extreme keywords. The choice of
extreme keywords and topic-related keywords should
be based on the dataset. To demonstrate, the extreme
keywords and topic-related keywords for the political
rumor dataset, to be presented in Section 6, are shown
in Table 1.
Table 1. Keywords for the experimental dataset
extreme
keywords
tcot, ccot, tlot, ocra, pjnet, #p2, nobama,
nohillary, stophillary, wakeupamerica,
ohhillno, 4prison, #stop,
topic-related
keywords
presiden, hillary, clinton, hart, obama,
bush, rush, cruz, trump, conservat,
democra, republic, socialis, senator,
carson, rubio, fiorina, walker, kasich,
huckabee, christie, paul, perry,
santorum, chafee, malley, sanders,
webb, biden, bloomberg, gore, poll,
gilmore, pataki, jindal, everson,
election, govern, pac, p.a.c, gop, g.o.p,
After transforming users into six-dimension feature
vectors, we run k-means clustering to generate K user
types. As a robust unsupervised clustering algorithm,
k-means clustering has previously used in other user
categorization tasks such as spammer detection [20]. We
note that k-means is not the only solution for clustering
users. Since our focus is not on user clustering but
the probabilistic model, we choose this method due to
its simplicity and efficiency, while other user clustering
methods can also easily fit into the framework. We use
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the R implementation of k-means2.After clustering, each
user is now mapped to a user type. For the reminder of
this paper, we will not consider individual users, and will
use user and user type interchangeably.
4. Reliability: A Simple Approach
Before we move into a more complex model, we
would like to introduce a simple approach, which is
based on a single user attribute, called reliability. The
rationale behind this approach is that users who retweets
rumors will likely be retweeting rumor again. And a
story that is retweeted mostly by users who retweet
rumor is likely to be a rumor. The reliability attribute
describes how probable a user will retweet a rumor.
Similar settings have previously been used for detecting
faulty sensors in sensor network researches [25].
Algorithmically, let CRu be the number of times user
u retweets a rumor, and Cu be the total number of
retweets from user u. The reliabilityRLBu is calculated
as:
RLBu =
CRu
Cu
.
Then we can derive a rumor score of a story based on
the reliability of users who retweet it. Specifically, for
a story which consists of N retweets, the rumor score is
calculated as:
score =
∑
iRLBu
N
where RLBu is the reliability of user u who made
retweet i. Finally, a threshold thres is set so that if
score > thres then the story is predicted to be a rumor,
and otherwise a true story.
This approach of using reliability to represent the
likelihood a user would retweet a rumor is arguably
reasonable and easy to implement. However, in practical
situations, considering every retweet of a rumor as of
malicious intend is over simplifying. In the next section
we will introduce our probabilistic model that describes
not only the behavior of retweeting rumors, but also the
retweet intentions.
5. Malicious User and Rumor Detection
In this section, we present our probabilistic model
of malicious user and rumor detection. We will first
introduce the concept of separate perceptions for rumor
and true stories, which supports the model. Then we will
introduce a method for learning the model from labeled
2https://stat.ethz.ch/R-manual/R-devel/library/stats/html/kmeans.html
stories, followed by a method for veracity prediction for
unlabeled stories.
5.1. Separate Perceptions for Rumors and
True Stories
When considering user attributes related to
rumor retweeting behavior, we intuitively think of
maliciousness. We first consider an extreme case that
a purely malicious user who would retweet and only
retweet rumors. On the other hand, a normal user is
a user who would never retweet a rumor. However,
in reality, retweeting behavior is complex. Not all
users retweeting a rumor are malicious users, and not
all stories retweeted by a malicious user are rumors.
We consider the following retweeting behaviors in our
model.
• A malicious user sees a rumor, understands that it
is a harmful rumor, and decides to retweet it.
• A normal user sees a rumor, but could not see that
it is a harmful rumor, considers it as a true story
instead, and retweets it.
• A malicious user sees a normal story, but due to
confusion he considers it as a harmful rumor and
retweets it.
We make an assumption by observing these
behaviors that users have different perceptions for
rumors and true stories. In addition to maliciousness,
the perception of rumor and true story together decides
whether a user will retweet a rumor or a true story.
Therefore we propose two latent attributes. The first
attribute is malicious sensitivity, denoted as θ, which
describes the likelihood a user retweets a rumor as a
rumor. The value 1 − θ describes user ignorance that
leads to retweeting rumor as true story. The second
attribute is malicious perplexity, denoted as φ, which
describes the likelihood a user retweets a true story as
a rumor. The value 1 − φ describes the likelihood of
the normal behavior of retweeting a true story as a true
story.
We then propose a latent variable that indicates
the retweet intention. This latent variable, denoted as
z, is corresponding to the retweets of stories, and is
influenced by θ and φ, as well as the story veracity. We
set zij = {1, 0} depending on if a retweet i of story j is
intended as a rumor or a true story.
5.2. A Probabilistic Model for Malicious User
and Rumor Detection
We now describe our probabilistic model based on
two user attributes, namely, malicious sensitivity and
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malicious perplexity, denoted as θ and φ, respectively,
and the latent variable z, where zij = 1 means retweet i
of story j is intended as a rumor, and zij = 0 means
retweet i of story j is intended as a true story. We
assume Beta distribution as the prior distribution for
each θi, and φi for user i:
θ ∼ Beta(β0,0, β0,1),
φ ∼ Beta(β1,0, β1,1).
We also have a labeled dataset D with labels l =
{r, t}, where a subset Dr contains only rumors, and
a subset Dt contains only true stories. The dataset D
consists ofM stories, each in turn consistsN retweeting
users. The latent variable z, corresponding to retweets r,
is thus depending on two user parameters and the label
l. The dependency relationships of these parameters
and variables are demonstrated in Figure 2, where the
observed variables are shaded.
z rl
θ ϕβ0 β1
K
N M
Figure 2. Graphical model of MURD
We generate retweet intention z as a Bernoulli
distribution with θ and φ as the parameters. Specifically,
when the story is a rumor (lj = 1),
zij ∼ Bernoulli(θi)
and when the story is a true story (lj = 0),
zij ∼ Bernoulli(φi).
5.3. Model Learning
The likelihood of the data is given as the following.
p(D|z, θ, φ) =
∏
p(Dr|z, θ)×
∏
p(Dt|z, φ)
=
∏
i,j∈Dr
[
θ
zij
i × (1− θi)1−zij
]
×
∏
i,j∈Dt
[
φ
zij
i × (1− φi)1−zij
]
.
(1)
Learning the model means finding the parameters
that will give the maximum likelihood of the above
formula. We will not attempt to solve the maximization
problem analytically, since there are too many
parameters and derivatives are intractable. Instead
we will use a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC)
method to approximate probability distribution of the
parameters, which is a popular method for solving
probabilistic models [26]. More specifically, we will
use Gibbs sampling [27]. Gibbs sampling is a type of
MCMC method that does not set a transit distribution
in random walks, but instead randomly defines one
parameter at a time assuming other parameters are given.
It has been shown that Gibbs sampling can approximate
parameter distributions faster and more accurate when
the model contains a large number of parameters [23].
The main focus of our Gibbs sampling algorithm
is the latent variable z. Since θ and φ can be easily
derived from z, they can be omitted in the algorithm.
Moreover, the probability of z can be derived from
counts of retweets in different veracity and intention
categories.
Let us use CRu to denote the count of retweets of
rumors by user u, and CTu the count of retweets of
true stories. Furthermore, CRRu denotes the count of
retweets of rumors intended as rumors by user u, and
CRTu the count of retweets of true stories intended as
rumors, both of which are derived from z. The posterior
probability of zij from user u can then be derived as:
p(zij = 1|lj = r, θ) = CR
R
u + β0,0
CRu + β0,0 + β0,1
,
p(zij = 1|lj = t, φ) = CR
T
u + β1,0
CTu + β1,0 + β1,1
.
Our implementation of the Gibbs sampling is shown
in Algorithm 1. The main function of the algorithm is to
assign zij one by one assuming all other z that are not
zij are given (line 4-20). The random walk is achieved
by setting zij randomly using the calculated probability
(7-17). As a typical MCMC algorithm setting, at fix
intervals after burn-in iterations, θ and φ are updated
(line 21-24). The final values for θ and φ are the average
values of multiple updates.
Finally, the maliciousness user attribute can be
derived from z. We can simply use the ratio of counts of
retweets intended as rumors in all retweets:
maliciousnessu =
CRRu + CR
T
u
CRu + C
T
u
.
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Algorithm 1 Gibbs sampling for learning users
maliciousness
1: s← sample size
2: randomly assign {0, 1} to z
3: for iter in n learning iterations do
4: for each story j with label l do
5: for each retweet i from user u do
6: update counters removing zij
7: if l = r then
8: p← CRRu+β0,0
CRu +β0,0+β0,1
9: else
10: p← CRTu+β1,0
CTu+β1,0+β1,1
11: end if
12: c← draw from Uniform[0, 1]
13: if c < p then
14: zij ← 1
15: else
16: zij ← 0
17: end if
18: update counters adding zij
19: end for
20: end for
21: if iter > burnin and iter%thin = 0 then
22: θ ← θ + 1s × CR
R
u+β0,0
CRu +β0,0+β0,1
23: φ← φ+ 1s × CR
T
u+β1,0
CTu+β1,0+β1,1
24: end if
25: end for
5.4. Inferring Unlabeled Stories
We have used the Gibbs sampling for learning user
attributes θ and φ given labeled stories. However, we
have not shown how to predict veracity of unlabeled
stories. In this section we will present a story
veracity prediction method based on the user attributes
learned from the training data. Our method is
based on Expectation Maximization (EM), which is
a popular algorithm for optimizing models involving
latent variables [28, 29]. A EM algorithm typically
involves alternating between two steps. In the
Expectation step, the most likely latent variable is set
given model parameters. In the Maximization step,
the parameters that maximize the model likelihood are
chosen, given fixed latent variable. The algorithm will
come to stop when the prediction converges.
In this part of veracity inference problem, we use the
same latent variable z to indicate retweet intention. For
model parameters, instead of user attributes, we now use
l to represent the latent story veracity. User attributes θ
and φ are taken as learned with the labeled training data.
Our EM algorithm is shown in Algorithm 2. First the
Algorithm 2 EM for learning new labels
1: initialize pred
2: while prediction not converged do
/* Expectation */
3: for each story j with prediction predj do
4: for each retweet i from user u do
5: if predj = t then
6: p← θu
7: else
8: p← φu
9: end if
10: if p > 0.5 then
11: zij ← 1
12: else
13: zij ← 0
14: end if
15: end for
16: end for
/* Maximization */
17: for each story j do
18: sr ← log p(l = r|z) from Equation (2)
19: st ← log p(l = t|z) from Equation (3)
20: if sr > st then
21: pred′j ← 1
22: else
23: pred′j ← 0
24: end if
25: end for
26: compare pred with pred′ and replace if
necessary
27: end while
prediction is initialized, usually with all positives (line
1). In the expectation step, we assign values to z given
the prediction and user attributes, based on the following
formula:
p(zij = 1|predj = r, θu) = θu,
p(zij = 1|predj = t, φu) = φu
and if p(zij = 1) > 0.5 we set zij as 1, otherwise we
set zij as 0 (line 5-14).
In the maximization step, the goal is to choose the
parameter τ so that the likelihood L(l; z) is maximized.
To choose the parameter, we consider the probability
formula:
p(l = r|z) ∝ p(z|l = r)p(l = r)
∝ p(l = r)
∏
ij
p(zij |lj = r)
where
p(zij |lj = r) = zij · θu + (1− zij) · (1− θu).
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Similarly we have:
p(zij |lj = t) = zij · φu + (1− zij) · (1− φu).
Since our goal is not to inference the exact
probability but to determine which parameter provides
higher probability, we can compare the log-likelihood,
which is more computationally efficient. More
specifically, we compare log p(l = r|z) and log p(l =
t|z), where
log p(l = r|z) = log p(l = r)
+
∑
i
log[zij · θu + (1− zij) · (1− θu)],
(2)
log p(l = t|z) = log(1− p(l = r))
+
∑
i
log[zij · φu + (1− zij) · (1− φu)].
(3)
After comparing the log-likelihood, we make a
prediction depending on which label provides higher
likelihood (line 18-24). Here the prior probability of
positive label p(l = r) needs to be set manually,
although normally it would not have a strong impact on
the prediction.
6. Experimental Analysis
In this section, we present our experimental analysis
based on two real-world datasets. We will first
explain the datasets, followed by evaluation metrics
and compared baselines. Then we will discuss the
experimental results.
6.1. Datasets
We use two previously studied rumor datasets that
contain user information and retweeting structure as our
experimental datasets [24]. Both datasets are collected
just before the 2016 U.S. presidency election, and
contain tweets regarding two political actors, Hillary
Clinton and Barack Obama. The first dataset, called
news dataset, contains a number of news stories that
include a link to a news article. The second dataset,
called picture dataset, contains a number of picture
stories that include a link to an online picture, which
usually shows texts describing a story. Both dataset
contain veracity labels for a number of stories, manually
assigned by examining the stories in external sources.
Examples of news stories are shown in Table 2 while
examples of picture stories are shown in Figure 3.
Table 2. Examples of labeled news stories
rumor
Hillary’s email firm was run from an apartment with
servers in the BATHROOM
The IT firm hired by Clinton to oversee her private server
was reportedly ’a mom and pop shop’
OBAMA SPENT $770 MILLION TAXPAYER $$$
REBUILD & RENOVATE MOSQUES
Revelation of God: Obama took on through a human
clone comes from Pharaoh Aka Obamunaki!
true story
@realDonaldTrump takes aim at Hillary Clinton in new
video just released on Instagram
Grassley questions whether Clinton attorney had
clearance for thumb drives
Tell the Obama Administration: Stop Garnishing Social
Security to Pay Student Loan Debt. Sign the petition here
President Obama’s New ’College Scorecard’ Is A Torrent
Of Data
The statistics of two datasets are shown in Table 3. In
a total there are 390 labeled stories. From the statistics
we can see that for news stories, the number of retweets
is larger but the number of users is smaller, indicating
repeating appearance of same users in different stories.
In contrast, picture stories contain less retweets but more
users.
Table 3. Statistics of datasets
#stories #rumors #tweets #users
news 132 35 18,517 3,640
picture 258 97 11,064 8,398
6.2. Evaluation Metrics and Compared
Baselines
The purpose of this evaluation is to test the
effectiveness of our method in predicting rumors. Thus
we use precision, recall, and f1 measures against the
rumor prediction. The precision is calculated as TPTP+FP
and recall TPTP+FN , where TP, FP, and FN are the
true positives, false positives and false negatives in
the prediction with regard to rumor labels. As the
overall accuracy indicator, f1 is calculated as 2 ×
precision×recall
precision+recall . We run 5-fold cross validation and
take the average result of five runs for each compared
method.
We compare the performance of the propose MURD
model with four baseline methods, namely, Castillo,
Liu, Bag-of-User (BOU), and RLB. Castillo et al. has
tested a list of features with regard to their effectiveness
in predicting message credibility, and has been used
as a popular baseline method in later works regarding
message veracity [14]. From the list of features, the
top-4 features are revealed to be user features, including
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(a) rumors
(b) true stories
Figure 3. Examples of labeled picture stories
average registered age, average status count, average
number of followers, and average number of friends. For
comparison, we extract these four user features from our
data. For each story retweeted by N users, the feature
is the average feature value of N users. We use random
forest as the learning model, which has been shown to
have a good accuracy when used with Castillo features.
As an extension to Castillo features, Liu et al.
propose an additional feature set, which is shown to have
improved the prediction accuracy [13]. As the second
baseline, we use four user features from Liu feature
set, including ratio of profiles that contains top domain
URL, person names, location names, and professions,
respectively. We handle this feature set in the same
way as the first baseline, and use random forest as the
learning model.
Given that a story includes a number of retweeting
users, a way to view this data is to consider it as a
Bag-of-Users (BOU), similar to Bag-of-Words in text
document analysis. For this baseline, we generate a
feature vector for each story, based on the count of
users who retweeted the story. The dimension of the
vector is the same as the number of classes used in the
k-means clustering of users. For the learning model we
use logistic regression, since we find that it has superior
performance comparing to SVM and random forest.
The forth baseline is the reliability-based approach
(RLB) we introduced in section 4. We use the median
score as the decision threshold, which means half of the
test data will be predicted as rumors and the other half
as true stories. Without prior knowledge of the ratio of
rumors in the dataset, we consider 0.5 as a reasonable
estimation.
6.3. Rumor Detection Results
The prediction accuracy results of the proposed and
baseline methods are shown in Table 4. The best score
for each metric is highlighted in bold font. Results of the
proposed MURD model are shown in the last column.
The last row shows the overall accuracy by averaging
f1 scores for the two datasets. As we can see from
the results, the proposed MURD model is significantly
better for the news dataset. For the picture dataset, Liu
features works the best. However, its performance is
poor for the news dataset. On average, MURD is shown
to be superior compared to the baseline methods.
Table 4. Accuracy results of proposed and
baseline methods
Castillo Liu BOU RLB MURD
news
prec 0.399 0.459 0.485 0.300 0.437
recall 0.185 0.177 0.216 0.580 0.610
f1 0.253 0.255 0.299 0.396 0.509
picture
prec 0.706 0.759 0.543 0.556 0.529
recall 0.692 0.706 0.506 0.719 0.743
f1 0.699 0.732 0.524 0.627 0.618
average
f1 0.476 0.493 0.411 0.511 0.563
We also investigate the method performance with
regard to different number of classes in the user
mapping. The results are shown in Figure 4. Among
tested methods, MURD is shown to be steadily better
for the news dataset regardless of K values. However,
for the picture dataset it shows mixed performance,
and surprisingly the RLB method, given its simplicity,
performs best. The effect on prediction accuracy by
changing K is not obvious, although we can tell the
performance is generally optimal when K = 20.
Here we give an explanation of why MURD achieves
good results for the news dataset but not so good for
the picture dataset. Figure 5 shows clustering of news
and picture retweets. We randomly plot 500 retweets
from both datasets, in which the two axis are two user
attributes, and two different symbols indicating if the
story retweeted is a rumor or a true story. We can see
clearly that the separation between users who retweeted
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Figure 4. Accuracy results with different K
values
rumors and users who retweeted true stories is much
more visible for the picture dataset than for the news
dataset. What it implies is that users retweeting rumors
and true stories are more similar for news stories than
for picture stories, and the reason is that rumors in the
news dataset are more difficult to be recognized than in
the picture dataset, and both malicious users and normal
users retweet news rumors. Consequently, consistent
with our intuition, when the stories are complex and
confusing, as in the news dataset, MURD can be much
more powerful by learning the intention latent variable,
which cannot be captured by the baseline methods.
0 20 40 60 80
0
20
40
60
80
topic percentage
pi
ct
ur
e 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
(a) news
0 20 40 60 80
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
topic percentage
pi
ct
ur
e 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
(b) picture
Figure 5. Clustering of news and picture
retweets
6.4. Malicious User Analysis
In this section, we provide an analysis of the
effectiveness of our approach in capturing malicious
users. This analysis is based on 20 user types and the
news stories dataset. We compare user maliciousness
learned by MURD with the coefficient learned by the
logistic regression on user types (the BOU method),
which shows which user type correlate most positively
to the rumor. The results for the two approaches are
quite different. We remove some user types containing
too few users (< 30). In the remaining 9 user types
ranked by maliciousness, the most malicious user type
ranked by MURD is the 5th ranked by BOU, and the
most malicious user type ranked by BOU is the 4th
ranked by MURD.
We compare the users who are judged as the most
malicious by MURD and BOU methods. We take the
user profile text of the users in the type found by both
methods and count the frequencies of words within
the text. We give each word a significance score as
frequency within the type
frequency in all user profiles , where the higher the score, the
more strongly the word is associated with the type.
The top words of the most malicious user type found
by MURD and BOU are shown in Table 5. As we
can see, the profile of the most malicious user type
found by MURD contains many aggressive words that
reveal the malicious characteristics of the user, while
that discovered by BOU appears to be rather neutral.
This result shows that MURD can detect malicious users
more effectively.
Table 5. Keywords associated with detected
malicious user types
MURD #tgdn, #pjnet, #ccot, military, #tcot,
constitutional, news, tweets, #2a, israel
BOU fans, media, account, twitter, com, http,
follow, father, christian, conservative
7. Conclusion
In this paper we propose a probabilistic model
for malicious user and rumor detection (MURD). In
contrast to existing approaches, we model not only the
behavior but also the intention when a user retweets
a rumor or a true story. This approach helps us
capture more accurately user maliciousness and rumor
veracity, especially when the stories are complex and
confusing. In experiments we use two datasets. The
news dataset contains stories that are more confusing,
while the picture dataset contains stories that are easier
to understand. The evaluation results show that MURD
achieves superior rumor detection accuracy for the news
dataset, which is consistent with our intuition. We
also show with examples that MURD can be quite
effective in capturing malicious users. In this work,
we have purposefully left out the content of the story.
Further implementation can additionally examine story
contents using existing techniques to achieve better
detection accuracy with combined results. Another
future direction maybe investigating retweet of stories
across different social media platforms.
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